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Abstract: In recent years Colombia has grown relatively rapidly, but it has been a biased growth. The 
energy sector (the locomotora minero-energetica, to use the rhetorical expression of President Juan Manuel 
Santos) grew much faster than the rest of the economy, while the manufacturing sector registered a negative 
rate of growth. These are classic symptoms of the well-known ‘Dutch disease’, but our purpose here is not 
to establish whether the Dutch disease exists or not, but rather to shed some light on the financial viability 
of several, simultaneous dynamics: 
(i) the existence of a traditional Dutch Disease being due to a large increase in mining exports and a 
significant exchange rate appreciation, 
(ii) a massive increase in foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in the mining sector, 
(iii) a rather passive monetary policy, aimed at increasing purchasing power via exchange rate appreciation,   
(iv) more recently, a large distribution of dividends from Colombia to the rest of the world and the 
accumulation of mounting financial liabilities.  
The paper will show that these dynamics constitute a potential danger for the stability of the Colombian 
economy. Some policy recommendations are also discussed. 
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1. Colombia: a bonanza for international investors? 
 
Since 2011, CIVETS has stood out as the new buzz word circulating among financial operators 
and possibly as a form of dogma in the near future. In the jargon of financial markets, this term is 
nothing but the acronym of six developing countries1 on which international investors should 
speculate, in search of high (and safe?) returns. 
Most observers believe that recent macroeconomic data fully confirm optimistic 
perspectives on Colombia. In 2013, The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) portrayed Colombia 
as a ‘ […] success story [which] is now one of the most open and most business-friendly countries 
in Latin America [...and in which] new opportunities are opening up for foreign investors, 
particularly in hydrocarbons and mining, construction, and electricity, and there is free-trade 
access to the US market’ (2013, p. 8). 
Park Madison Partners (PMP), a New York based business leader in the real estate sector, 
acknowledges Colombian achievements as being due to “sound” macroeconomic management of 
the economy. According to PMP, fiscal discipline and a successful inflation-targeting monetary 
policy have contributed towards creating a stable macroeconomic environment together with 
persistently positive growth rates, even in the wake of the most recent worldwide financial crisis,2 
see figure 1 (left-hand side). PMP further notes that Colombian monetary authorities have wisely 
decided not to obstruct any market-driven appreciation of the Colombian peso, in order to reassure 
foreign investors regarding the political commitment to avoid market distortions and policy-
induced exchange rate risks.3 Thanks to such policies Colombia is now characterized by ‘a vibrant 
and developing capital market [...and the above] attractive fundamentals also create significant 
                                                          
1 CIVETS stands for Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa. 
2 In the last decade, Colombian per capita income grew at rates that are certainly not comparable to the fastest-growing Asian 
economies. Still, despite an inevitable slowdown from 2007 to 2009, Colombian per capita GNI grew annually at an average of 
5.3% between 2004 and 2013. 
3 Following Coelho and Gallagher (2013), Colombia temporary introduced some capital controls in order to tame booming capital 
inflows and reduce pressures on real exchange rate appreciation from May 2007 to October 2008. These measures, however, have 
proved to be too mild to reach their targets and thus have been lifted since then. 
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opportunities in the real estate (PMP, 2013, p. 12).’ The increasing Balance of Payments surpluses 
(figure 1, right-hand side) and mounting capital inflows would seem to confirm Colombia’s bright 
future. 
[Figure 1] 
 
The above reports and recent analyses by the Colombian government4 create the impression of a 
perfectly sound economy enjoying high and stable growth. In this paper, we argue that this 
apparent situation has a much broader aspect and such seemingly good performances hide more 
disturbing processes. On the one hand, past and prospected macroeconomic records have largely 
depended on – and indeed will continue to hinge upon – the increasing exploitation of Colombian 
natural resources, as well as high commodity prices on international markets. On the other hand, 
and perhaps more fundamentally, a dangerous process is currently unfolding within the Colombian 
economy, i.e. a dependence on foreign capital inflow to support a surprisingly high current account 
deficit.5 We believe these facts may pose serious challenges to Colombian development in the near 
future. 
International and domestic institutions have shared some of the above concerns. OECD 
(2013), for instance, explicitly points out the relative, and at times absolute, contraction of the non-
resource-based tradable good sector with respect to the energy and mining industry. In a working 
paper published by the Central Bank, Ojeda et al. (2014) elaborate on a DSGE model to assess the 
effects of a natural resource boom in the context of a three-sector small open economy. Both 
analyses share the description of structural (sectorial) changes in the Colombian economy, which 
follow the lines of a standard Dutch disease phenomenon. In a nutshell, the expansion of the energy 
sector and the ensuing foreign revenue windfall first raise domestic expenditures and lead to a real 
                                                          
4 See Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (2014a), ‘An Outlook of the Colombian Economy’, freely available for download at 
http://www.minhacienda.gov.co/HomeMinhacienda/saladeprensa/Presentaciones. 
5 Increasing exploitation of domestic natural resources and high commodity prices are usually associated to long-lasting current 
account surpluses, see Ojeda et al. (2014) for example. 
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exchange rate appreciation. This, in turn, makes domestic manufacture less profitable and less 
attractive for investment, thus downsizing it. The two papers conclude with similar policy 
implications. For example, they advise for counter-cyclical fiscal policies in order to cut 
expenditures and soften real exchange rate appreciation. The focus of this paper is different. We 
do not want to establish whether there is Dutch disease in Columbia or not. Rather, we claim that, 
on top of the long-run dynamics traditionally associated with a Dutch disease (i.e. de-
industrialization, exchange rate appreciation, trade balance surplus, etc.), Colombia is 
experimenting unsustainable medium to long run financial dynamics related to the Dutch disease 
impacts on the balance of payments. For this reason, we will concentrate our analysis on the 
dynamics observed in the balance of payments components, namely the trade balance, the net 
factor payments and the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows. 
The astonishing expansion of the energy and mining industry in Colombia mostly relies on 
FDI targeting the sector. The object of this paper is to check whether such a boom might give rise 
to financial fragility (boom-and bust cycles) and a deterioration of growth prospects. The 
fundamental mechanics of what we are suggesting are as follows. A large FDI inflow leads to 
balance of payments surpluses and, in a flexible exchange rate regime, to nominal (and real) 
appreciation of the domestic currency. At first, such an appreciation jeopardizes Colombian 
manufacture’s competitiveness and exports, thus inducing considerable manufactured goods trade 
deficits and some de-industrialization.6 On top of this, the exchange rate nominal appreciation 
attracts short-term portfolio investments, thus further appreciation, further de-industrialization and 
mounting foreign debt. Eventually, the repatriation of profits accruing to foreign investors in the 
energy sector (as well as the growing manufacturing trade deficit) leads to a deterioration in the 
current account such that the overall balance of payments may turn negative. The ‘boom’ turns 
                                                          
6 Goda and Torres (2013) perform an econometric analysis in order to test the existence of any effects of FDI on Colombian real 
exchange rate and, in turn, on manufacturing development. Their sample coverage runs from 1996 (first quarter) to 2012 (first 
quarter). On the one hand, they conclude that ‘net FDI and net other inflows are the main drivers of the post-2003 capital inflow 
appreciation effect in Colombia (Goda and Torres, 2013, p. 16)’. On the other hand, they find that real exchange rate appreciation 
explains most of the de-industrialization episode currently underway in Colombia. 
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into a ‘bust’ and, without central bank’s interventions, the exchange rate depreciates. Such medium 
run cyclical dynamics may be detrimental to long-run growth because it is likely to reduce (both 
directly and indirectly) the share of manufacture in total GDP and manufacturing constitutes, à la 
Kaldor, the ultimate source of labor productivity growth and long-run development. Our purpose, 
and let us assert this point, is thus to establish whether this Colombian pattern of growth is 
macroeconomically viable and sustainable in the medium to long run.  
Section 2 briefly outlines the abundant literature on Dutch disease, to make it clearer what 
we are (and what we are not) discussing. Section 3 provides evidence supporting the idea that 
Colombia is currently experiencing a de-industrialization process. Section 4 continues the analysis 
by observing some interesting macroeconomic features of the current Colombian pattern of 
growth. In particular, we look at changes in the sectorial destination of Foreign Direct Investments 
and at the decoupling in the dynamics of the current account and trade balance. Section 5 
recapitulates our findings and describes briefly the risks associated with such a pattern. To 
emphasize these risks and make them more evident, we provide a scenario analysis, assessing the 
financial stability of the processes currently unfolding in the Colombian economy. We conclude 
discussing some policy options. 
 
2. Dutch disease in a nutshell 
 
Dutch disease is a well-known issue in the field of development economics. According to the 
original contribution by Corden and Neary (1982), it refers to the structural consequences of a 
change in the sectorial composition of an economy, i.e. the relative and absolute reduction in the 
manufacturing sector’s participation to GDP, due to a boom in the use of domestic natural 
resources. The traditional literature on this topic describes the Dutch disease as a real-side 
phenomenon, taking place through real-side mechanisms. In particular, a shock such as a sudden 
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technological innovation in the energy sector,7 the discovery of new natural resource endowments, 
and/or rising international prices of primary commodities, tends to raise domestic expenditures 
and alter domestic relative prices against the non-traditional tradable sector. Such a real exchange 
rate appreciation in turn reduces the viability and profitability of the manufacturing sector. In a 
general equilibrium framework, while both the energy and services sectors may expand, the 
manufacturing sector producing non-traditional tradable goods will shrink. 
While it is worth studying such structural changes on their own, they are even more 
important if they entail consequences on the long-run growth potential of the economy. Indeed, 
several studies interpret the Dutch disease as the main source of a natural resource curse, i.e. the 
general disappointing economic performance of natural resource-rich countries compared to 
natural resource-poor economies (see Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001). In this regard, the core point 
of the Dutch disease-natural resource curse nexus lies in the growth-enhancing properties generally 
attributed to manufacturing, with respect to the energy sector and services (see Sachs and Warner, 
1995 and 1999; Ros, 2001; Ha-Joon Chang, 2010), so that the real wage, the profit rate and labor 
productivity growth may be simultaneously higher in a sufficiently large manufacturing-based 
economy with respect to countries specializing in non-manufacturing and non-tradable sectors 
(Ros, 2001, Botta, 2010).8 
Regardless of the specific mechanisms at work and their theoretical or empirical character, 
all these analyses share the common aspect of being real side studies without a well-defined 
macroeconomic framework based on national accounting. In a way, they follow the original 
contribution of Corden and Neary (1982, p.825) by ‘ignoring the monetary implications’ of natural 
resource booms and the ensuing structural changes, i.e. the effects such events may trigger on the 
                                                          
7 Corden and Neary (1982) assume a Hicks-neutral technological progress to take place in the energy sector, raising both labor and 
capital productivity in that sector. Similar results could also be obtained if an increase of primary commodities’ prices is assumed 
and the country under consideration is a net exporter of primary energy commodities, or if there is an increase in the endowment 
of the natural resource input specific to the energy sector. 
8 Torvik (2001) allows for different results by allowing for learning-by-doing to take place in the non-tradable sector as well, and 
technological spill-over running both ways (from manufacturing to services and vice versa). 
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external balance and financial solidity of the economies under observation. Sachs and Warner 
(1995, 1999), for instance, assume the current account of the balance of payments to be always in 
equilibrium thanks to natural resource ‘manna’ counterbalancing trade deficits arising from 
increased imports of tradable goods. Gylfason, Herbertsson, and Zoega (1999) assume an 
exogenous trade surplus in order to meet interest payments on a given and constant stock of foreign 
debt. When capital movements and financial transactions are considered (see Mansoorian, 1991), 
they are formalized in a perfect foresight infinite horizon framework, in which international 
borrowing and accumulating foreign debt today are repaid through expanding manufacturing 
productions, increasing domestic savings and rising current account surpluses tomorrow.9 
Accordingly, in these models, boom-and-bust cycles linked to mounting foreign debts are ignored 
by assumption, even though they may represent relevant ways in which natural resource booms 
may influence long-run economic dynamics (Manzano and Rigobon, 2001). 
Our contribution aims to fill this gap. In this sense, it draws illumination and insight from 
two previous works by Dutt (1997) and Taylor (2004). Dutt (1997) emphasizes that incoming FDI 
may induce detrimental effects on the catching up process of developing economies, depending 
on the productive sector targeted by FDI. Taylor (2004, chapter 12) describes the cyclical boom-
and-bust dynamics, which are possibly set in motion by temporary capital inflows in developing 
economies. Our paper represents an attempt to put these two perspectives together in order to 
assess the macroeconomic instability and external vulnerability possibly originating from the FDI-
induced Colombian Dutch disease.10 
 
                                                          
9 Different conclusions with respect to the standard ‘Dutch disease’ literature can be obtained when inter-temporal optimization 
and consumption smoothing is allowed through financial market mechanisms. Mansoorian (1991), for instance, finds that a real 
depreciation and an expanding manufacturing sector could emerge in the long run as the optimal response to over-borrowing, real 
exchange rate appreciation and de-industrialization in the short run. These conclusions reinforce those provided by Bruno and 
Sachs, who stress that ‘optimizing far-sight households (and government) will not consume all current oil revenues, but will rather 
save in anticipation of the future decline […] to the extent that the current revenues overstate the ‘perpetuity equivalent’ of oil 
earnings, a focus on current production levels overstates the resource allocation consequences of the oil sector (Bruno and 
Sachs,1982, p. 858).’ 
10 Considering the interplay between financial and real factors in the analysis of Dutch disease is not completely new. See, for 
instance, Blecker and Seccareccia (2008). 
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3. Structural Change and Sectorial dynamics in Colombia 
 
Colombia has already gone through various episodes of de-industrialization.11 On top of the 
current sharp decline in manufacturing sector’ share in real value added, a similar trend also 
emerged from 1990 to 1999. The Colombian de-industrialization episode of the 1990s was most 
likely due to the radical switch in economic policy that Colombia went through during that period. 
The reform process, centered on trade liberalization, is deemed to have harshly hit Colombian 
industry, manufacturing in particular, which had been traditionally supported by a protectionist 
trade regime (Ocampo, 1994). Colombian manufacturing output share eventually reached a 
minimum in 1999. The deep economic downturn that affected Colombia in that year was as a result 
of the fall-out from financial crises in other emerging countries contributing to this dynamic. 
The Colombian manufacturing sector partially recovered at the beginning of the 2000s. However 
since 2007, the share of the manufacturing sector has been shrinking again in a remarkable and 
consistent way. The current episode of de-industrialization (or, better, de-manufacturing) does not 
comprise a general or proportional decline in all the several components of the industrial sector. 
Indeed, the contraction of manufacturing sector is accompanied by an increase in the energy 
sector’s real GDP share. By the first quarter in 2014, Colombian manufacturing accounted for less 
than 11% of real GDP, while the energy sector share has been constantly expanding. 
Figure 2 shows the quarterly growth rate differential for the mining and manufacturing 
sectors with respect to GDP. We observe, first, that the volatility of the mining sector growth rate 
is much higher than the manufacturing one. Aside from this high volatility, there seem to be no 
distinct trend until mid-2007, when the mining sector starts enjoying a growth rate mostly above 
GDP while the opposite is true for the manufacturing sector.  
[Figure 2] 
                                                          
11 The debate on Colombian deindustrialization dates back to at least 1986, see Kamas (1986). 
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We use the standard Chow test to validate the structural break that seem to emerge from the data. 
The data set consists of 53 quarterly observations from 2001 Q1 to 2014 Q1. Unfortunately, due 
to a change in the methodology used by the Colombian statistical office (DANE), we cannot 
include previous data. Table 1 and Table 2 show the estimation results for the mining and 
manufacturing sectors. The tests indicate that there seems to be a structural break for both series 
in 2007Q3. There is no clear trend before 2007Q3. The mining sector seems to grow less than 
GDP (1.07% below GDP, not statistically significant), while the manufacturing one is growing at 
a par with GDP (0.13% above GDP, not statistically significant). After 2007Q3, however, the trend 
is by contrast very clear. The mining sector experienced an above-than-GDP growth rate (+1.15%) 
while the manufacturing one is growing at a rate lower than GDP (-0.99%). 
[Table 1] 
[Table 2] 
  
All the above-mentioned de-industrialization episodes are consistent with the worst de-
industrialization case stressed by Tregenna (2011).12 From 1985 to 1995, Colombia is the only 
developing economy in which the contraction of the manufacturing sector outweighed the increase 
in labor-intensity (a decreasing labor productivity). Sadly, these findings are confirmed for the 
2007-2013 period.13 Data reported in table 3 show that a negative variation in the manufacturing 
                                                          
12 Tregenna (2011) identifies three possible processes leading to de-industrialization as measured by a reduction of the 
manufacturing employment share. First, a reduction in labor-intensity (increase in labor productivity) coupled with a contraction 
of that sector output; second, a reduction in labor-intensity that outweighs the expansion of sector production; finally, the 
contraction of sectorial activity that outweighs the increase in labor-intensity (decline in labor productivity). Such processes, all 
giving rise to a lower manufacturing employment share, are likely to prompt different and perhaps opposite effects on overall 
economic records. This is also the reason why analogous trends in manufacturing employment in Asian and Latin American 
economies, Colombia among them, have been often associated to diverging economic performances. Whilst the former registered 
increasing manufacturing value added shares and even stronger improvements in manufacturing labor productivity, most Latin 
American economies experienced worrisome premature reductions in manufacturing GDP shares, and dismal increases in labor 
productivity by international standards. Indeed, ‘if a decrease in manufacturing employment share is primarily accounted for by 
falling labor-intensity of manufacturing, this calls into question the extent to which ‘de-industrialization’ is an appropriate 
characterization. The point is that a fall in the share of manufacturing employment that is mostly accounted for by falling labor 
intensity (i.e. increasing labor productivity) would not necessary have a negative impact on growth. This is different from the case 
where the fall in the share of manufacturing employment is associated primarily with a decline of the manufacturing sector as a 
share of GDP. In such a scenario, an economy would be particularly at risk of losing out on the growth-pulling effects of 
manufacturing (Tregenna, 2011, p.15).’ 
13 Variations in the sectorial employment share can be decomposed into three elements: variations in the labor-intensity 
characterizing sector’s production (i.e. the labor-intensity effect); variations in the sectorial GDP share (i.e. the sector share effect); 
variations of overall labor productivity, which obviously affect overall employment dynamics (i.e. the above labor-productivity 
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employment share in the order of 1,8 percentage points is due to the significant contraction of 
manufacturing participation to GDP. Such a contraction outweighs the reduction in manufacturing 
labor productivity. These puzzling and worrisome dynamics in Colombian manufacturing labor 
productivity can be partially explained by manufacturing sub-sectors’ dynamics. Since 2000, more 
disaggregated data (see DANE, 2014) reveal that production of basic metallic and non-metallic 
goods have expanded their participation in manufacturing value added. By contrast, the 
manufacturing value added share attributed to the chemical industry, has decreased. The same 
story applies to the capital goods sector. While the former are usually classified as labor-intensive 
and low-skill sectors, with little scope for innovation and productivity growth, the latter are 
medium and high-skill technology-intensive sectors characterized by stronger (productivity) 
growth opportunities.14 Overall, it seems that Colombian manufacturing is not only shrinking in 
relative and absolute terms, but it is concentrated in labor-intensive low-skill industries. Hence, it 
might be a reasonable concern that the ongoing de-industrialization process might seriously 
impinge on Colombian long run development, provided that the non-traditional sophisticated 
tradable goods sectors still represent a fundamental source of labor productivity dynamics (Rodrik, 
2007; Szirmai, 2012). 
[Table 3] 
 
4. Real exchange rate dynamics, Foreign Direct Investments, and the Colombian 
external account 
 
The macroeconomic dynamics briefly sketched in the first sections of this paper depend on a wide 
                                                          
effects). We can represent the sectorial employment share (hence its variation) according to this formula: 
𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑡
=
𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗
𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑌𝑡
∗
𝑌𝑡
𝐿𝑡
 , Lit 
being employment level in sector i at time t, Yit sectorial production at time t, Lt and Yt overall employment and production levels. 
It is worth noting that the sectorial labor intensity (or the inverse of the labor productivity) is a output-weighted average of each 
sub-sector labor intensities. Thus, a decrease in labor productivity does not necessarily imply using a less efficient technology but 
can be the result of a change of the output shares in favor of a more labor-intensive sub-sector. 
14 See UNCTAD (2014), ‘Manufactured goods by degree of manufacturing’, freely available for download from 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Classifications.html. 
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range of endogenous and exogenous factors of both long- and short-run nature. In 2008 and 2009, 
there is no doubt that temporary circumstances linked to the worldwide ‘Great Recession’ have 
negatively affected Colombian GDP growth. At a more profound level, Colombian performances 
are likely to be affected by some radical changes in the Colombian domestic policy framework. 
Since the end of the 80s, Colombia is experiencing a long-lasting and deep reform process. At the 
beginning of the 90s, the so-called ‘apertura hacia adentro’ was launched, aiming to move 
Colombia, and the Colombian industrial sector in particular, from a fairly protected trade regime 
to an open and liberalized setting. More recently, this process has continued through a long series 
of free trade agreements.15 Further, since the mid-2000s the regulation of the mining and energy 
sectors has been subject to important modifications. In 2004, the government lifted the restrictions 
to foreign companies’ exploitation of domestic oil resources (UNCTAD, 2006). Accordingly, the 
monopolistic control of the oil sector by domestic firms has been removed and the national 
company Ecopetrol partially privatized. Such a regime shift, together with significant natural 
resource discoveries and high prices of primary commodities, have steered massive foreign direct 
investment towards Colombia. 
 
4.1 The FDI-exchange rate nexus 
 
Most economists would interpret the recent appreciation of the Colombian peso as the main factor 
curtailing the profitability and viability of Colombian manufacturing. Such an appreciation would 
in turn be attributed to a natural resource boom raising domestic expenditures and lifting inflation, 
in particular non-tradable sector inflation. 
                                                          
15 United States of America  (22/11/2006), Chile (27/11/2006), Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, 
09/08/2007), Canada (21/11/2008), European Free Trade Association (25/11/2011) and European Union (26/06/2012), source: 
Organization of American State’s Foreign Trade Information System, http://www.sice.oas.org. 
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Since 2003, the Colombian real exchange rate has appreciated by 6.6% yearly on average (see 
figure 3).16 However, contrary to what might be expected, most of this trend comes from nominal 
appreciation, in the order of 6.4% yearly, rather than strong inflationary pressures. Data from 
international economic organizations confirm that Colombian inflation has been under control and 
has decreased remarkably since 2008. Since 2003 Colombia has experienced the lowest inflation 
rates among CIVETS countries.17 Colombian inflation has often been lower than that registered in 
many of its most relevant trading partners, Latin American ones in particular. According to IMF 
(2014), it was below 3% in 2013 and it is expected to be around 1.9% in 2014.18  
[Figure 3] 
 
Of course, it could be said that nominal and real appreciation of the Colombian peso might come 
from Colombian trade and current account surpluses. But data relating to Colombian external 
accounts show that this is not the case. Since 2001, Colombia has experienced a persistent although 
modest trade deficit only replaced by a mild surplus in 2011. Yet, the Colombian current account 
has remained in deficit, and it has surprisingly worsened and diverged from an improving trade 
account. It is now in the order of more than 3% of GDP. 
In order to understand why despite a growing current account deficit the Colombian peso 
revaluated so heavily over the last ten years, it is instructive to have a look to all the different 
components of the Colombian balance of payments. It is crucial to emphasize that the capital 
account surplus more than compensated for the current account deficit. In the period 2002-2013 
the cumulated current account deficit amounted to US$ 67 billion, whereas the capital account 
surplus reached more than US$ 97 billion. These numbers seem to indicate that the origin of the 
                                                          
16 In Figure 3, according to UNCTAD data, upward trends in the nominal and real effective exchange rate indexes stand for 
appreciations. Depreciations are represented by downward sloping sections in exchange rates dynamics. 
17 According to data provided by the IMF (2014), from 2003 to 2012, Colombia has experienced average inflation rates significantly 
lower than those observed in other emerging economies such as Brazil (1,6 percentage point less), India (2,6), South Africa (0,8) 
and Turkey (5,7). 
18 See IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2014). Data freely available from http://www.imf.org. 
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Colombian Dutch disease is perhaps to be found in the macro sphere, in the financial one in 
particular. 
In the case of Colombia, Foreign Direct Investment has shown some degree of volatility 
and instability due to exogenous economic factors (i.e. the worldwide ‘Great Recession’), and their 
links to one-shot investment opportunities. SABMiller Company’s acquisition of the local beer 
brand Bavaria lies behind the erratic jump in Colombian FDI in 2005, for instance. This fact 
notwithstanding, Colombia has experienced a significant and apparently structural increase in 
incoming FDI since 2005. Indeed, before 2005 and throughout the 1990s, overall Foreign Direct 
Investments in Colombia have rarely been higher than 3% of GDP (according to UNCTAD, they 
stood out at 4,37% of GDP only in 1997). However, they peaked up to almost 7% of Colombian 
GDP in 2005, and have remained systematically and remarkably above 3% of GDP since then (the 
only exception being in 2010). In absolute terms, from 1990 to 2004, net FDI were equal to US$ 
1.6 billion on a yearly average. Since 2005, they averaged US$ 6.5 billion. In 2012, net FDI 
represented almost 100% of the positive net Colombian financial account, these same figures being 
far higher than 50% in 2007 and 2008.  
Incoming Foreign Direct Investment, in particular those targeting the domestic energy 
sector, have greatly contributed to the surplus in the Colombian capital account and overall 
Balance of Payments since 2004. Furthermore, in the last five years, increasing net foreign 
portfolio investment has further reinforced the macroeconomic implications, read Colombian 
peso’s nominal and real exchange rate appreciation, of the above mentioned FDI flows. Indeed, in 
the first part of the 2000s, net foreign portfolio investment in Colombia was low or even negative. 
A remarkable change has apparently taken place since 2007. With only the exception of 2008 
(which was likely due to the worldwide consequences of the subprime financial turmoil), net 
foreign portfolio investment has been always positive and increasing since that year. In 2007, it 
amounted to 1.3 billion dollars, i.e. 0.64% of Colombian GDP. From 2011 to 2013 it surged to far 
more than 5.5 billion dollars yearly, i.e. more than 1.5% of Colombian GDP. According to data 
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provided by the Central Bank of Colombia, it amounted to 2.5 billion dollars in the first quarter of 
2014.  
A type of self-reinforcing process between FDI flows, portfolio investment, and exchange 
rate appreciation seems thus to characterize the more recent evolution of the Colombian external 
account. Mounting FDI flows have provided the first move for the Colombian peso’s ongoing 
appreciation. International investors’ enthusiasm for Colombian growth opportunities and, say, 
exchange-rate induced capital gains, have then led to increasing net foreign short-term portfolio 
investment. In the light of the structural (sectorial) consequences of such macroeconomic trends 
and of the current account imbalances reported in next section, it would seem a straightforward 
progression to wonder whether such a self-feeding process may turn out to be unsustainable in the 
near future. 
 
4.2 Colombian trade and its current account 
 
Figure 4 provides a closer look at the evolution of the Colombian current account and of its sub-
components. Colombian structural dependence on imports of manufactured goods emerges 
strikingly. Despite fluctuations linked to economic cycles, the trade deficit in manufactured goods 
has been increasing since the beginning of the 2000s. It is now close to 10% of GDP. Obviously, 
these figures change radically when trade flows linked to the energy and mining sectors are taken 
into account. Since 2001, the overall trade account in goods and services has registered deficits no 
higher than 2% of GDP. Over the last four years, it has been close to balance, even though not yet 
positive (with the exception of 2009), thanks to the high prices of primary commodities. 
[Figure 4] 
 
Interestingly, before 2005, Colombian trade and current accounts showed closely similar dynamics 
and positively co-moved. Rising (resp. decreasing) trade deficits were associated with increasing 
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(resp. decreasing) current account deficits. Since 2005, however, diverging trends have emerged. 
While the overall trade account has remained close to balance, the current account deficit has 
steadily increased to above 3 percent of GDP. Such an apparently puzzling fact can be explained 
through the data portrayed in figure 5. Here we describe the dynamics of some of the above 
components of the current account, (net) repatriated profits linked to FDIs in particular. Data are 
expressed as index numbers, 1995 being the base year. Both the current account deficit and 
manufacturing trade deficit show an upward trend. In 2013, the manufacturing trade deficit shows 
as being more than four times higher than it was in 1995. What is more, net factor income show 
astonishing dynamics. While they amounted to 0.29 percent of GDP in 1995, they stand at 2.85 
percent of Colombian GDP in 2013 (practically the whole current account deficit). Their 2013 
value is more than 30 times higher than the initial 1995 value. 
[Figure 5] 
 
5. The Macroeconomics of the Financial Dutch Disease: a scenario analysis 
 
According to the literature reviewed in section 2 and to the empirical evidence presented in 
sections 3 and 4, the picture we have described so far seems to suggest the existence of a strange 
sort of Dutch disease in Colombia. Its peculiar ingredients and the main mechanisms at work can 
be summarized in a few points.  
First, the Colombian peso has significantly revaluated in the last decade, both in nominal 
and real terms. The excess world demand for Colombian pesos, however, does not come from the 
need to finance a rest-of-the-world current account deficit vis-à-vis Colombia. The world is not 
swamped by Colombian exports. On the contrary, Colombia continues to experience a structural 
and increasing manufacturing trade deficit. High international prices of primary commodities and 
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an expanding energy sector have helped to bring the overall Colombian trade account back to 
equilibrium. Yet, the Colombian current account is negative and worsening.  
Second, Colombian peso revaluation can be explained by the dynamics of capital inflows, 
and among them FDI are overwhelmingly important. In the more recent period, the Colombian 
peso’s appreciation has also been supported by positive and increasing net foreign portfolio 
investment aiming to exploit profit and capital gain opportunities emerging in the economy. A 
brief sectorial analysis also reveals that FDI are more and more directed towards the oil sector. In 
2003, the real price of oil started increasing and peaked in 2008 (well above the level it had reached 
in the 1982, at the top of the second oil shock). Today, it is more than 150% higher than it was in 
2000 (Missaglia, 2012). Faced with such tremendously strong incentives, global oil companies 
accelerated their investment processes and oil-rich countries experienced a rapid growth of 
incoming FDI and an important expansion in the mining sectors. Colombia was no exception. 
According to a more disaggregated sectorial perspective, since 2006 FDI in the energy sector have 
accounted for close to 50% or more of all Colombian incoming FDI on an annual basis. Figure 6 
below shows the quarterly FDI per sector (Oil or Other) from 1996Q1 to 2012Q4 (68 
observations). 
[Figure 6] 
 
The data seems to indicate a change in FDI distribution from around 2001 onwards.  We ran a 
Chow test to check for structural breaks and estimated the average shares for different samples. 
Table 4 presents the results. There is a structural break in 2001Q2 where the share of FDI accruing 
to Oil and Other sector has substantially changed. Indeed, the Oil (resp. Other) sector has observed 
an increase (resp. decrease) in the FDI share. 
[Table 4] 
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Both facts (the exchange rate revaluation and massive energy sector-oriented FDI) contribute to 
shift the Colombian productive structure away from manufacturing and to make it increasingly 
dependent on the exploitation of domestic natural resources.   
Third, this kind of FDI generates high returns, but profits are typically expatriated. Indeed, 
between 2009 and 2012, the incoming flows of FDI (39,306 US$ millions) have been lower than 
the outgoing flow of profits (42,469 US$ millions), see Cabrera Galvis (2013). This fact is 
disturbing on a twofold level. First, before being expatriated, these profits are not taxed. Following 
Ocampo, 
  
“[T]his reflects Colombia’s inability to take advantage of commodities’ prices boom 
through taxation […] this was done in the past during the coffee price boom. This 
contrast is even more striking when thinking that coffee profits were captured by 
someone in the country. On the contrary, today’s oil profits are essentially going to 
foreign enterprises” (Ocampo 2013, p.15).  
 
Second, huge profits repatriation by foreign investment in the Colombian oil sector emerges as the 
leading force behind Colombian current account imbalances. Whilst these imbalances may easily 
turn out to be structural and permanent, we cannot say the same for the FDIs that have so far 
financed the existing external gap. 
The kind of productive changes and external imbalances currently underway in Colombia cast 
serious doubts on its long-run growth potential and financial stability. 
 
5.1 Possible future scenarios 
 
We have already emphasized our concern about a negative link between de-industrialization and 
productivity dynamics. This concern will be even stronger if we consider the current reduction in 
manufacturing participation to the GDP to be linked to a decreasing manufacturing labor 
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productivity. Clearly, such facts are at odds with those historically observed in developed and 
successful East Asian ‘catching-up’ countries. The relative concentration of Colombian 
manufacturing in labor-intensive low-skill productions may significantly downsize Colombia 
opportunities as to the accumulation of human capital and generation of innovation and 
technological spillovers on the rest of the economy. This is likely to weaken productivity dynamics 
and harm economic development. However, these dynamics, linked to a more traditional vision of 
the Dutch Disease are likely to develop at a rather slower pace since it involves a structural change 
of the composition of the economy which typically is measured in decades rather than years.  
We are concerned about the dynamics unfolding in a much shorter time frame. Persistent 
and large current account imbalances have often been perceived as destabilizing factors, 
potentially leading to exchange rate crises and financial turmoil in developing countries. Colombia 
is no exception and the data presented in section 4 leads one to ask whether the current Colombian 
development pattern is financially sustainable. In order to address this issue, we propose a scenario 
analysis19 on the possible evolution of the various components of the Colombian Balance of 
Payments. Our analysis relies on the data provided by the Colombian government as to the 
expected dynamics of oil prices, oil production and exports, GDP and imports growth rates 
(Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, 2014a).20 Further, the government’s expectations in terms 
of current account dynamics and net capital inflows and variation in foreign reserves have been 
published. We do not have available additional information concerning net factor payments, profit 
repatriation in particular, and non-oil exports. The aim of our analysis is twofold. First, we compute 
the required evolutions in our ‘unknown’ variables, net factor payments or non-oil exports 
alternatively, in order to meet government’s expectations. Second, we simulate future possible 
dynamics of some relevant components of Colombian Balance of Payments according to past-
                                                          
19 The R source code and the datasets used to generate all graphs and econometric results of this paper can be found on the website 
of one of the authors. 
20 Unfortunately, we do not have detailed yearly values for the capital account and Foreign Direct Investment but only averages 
over the time period. 
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observed trends. We are interested in the implications of such trends, should they persist in the 
upcoming years, in terms of current account, capital account, foreign reserve accumulation. In this 
sense, we want to test the consistency of these emerging figures with government expectations. 
The right-hand side of figure 7 reproduces government’s expectations in terms of foreign 
capital inflows and current account. The left-hand side of figure 7 in turn portrays government 
projections as to oil exports and overall imports of goods and services. The government’s 
expectations are such that a persistent current account deficit should slightly decrease from 3,6% 
of GDP in 2014 to around 3% of GDP in 2024. Capital account and net FDI inflows are expected 
to remain, on average, in the order of 4% and 3.7% of GDP, respectively (in 2014, Colombian 
government expects a capital account surplus close to 5% of GDP). The capital account surplus is 
thus expected to fully cover current account deficits and allow Colombian foreign reserves to pile 
up even further. 
[Figure 7] 
 
5.2  Current account dynamics 
 
In the left-hand side of figure 8, we show the current dynamics of Colombian net factor payments. 
Consistently with figure 6, it has become astonishingly negative in the last decade mainly due to 
an enormous increase in FDIs profit repatriation. We assume three possible scenarios as to future 
net factor payments evolution. First, we assume it maintains a constant nominal value, equal to its 
2013 level, throughout the next ten years (dashed line). Second, we assume NFP to move at the 
same pace as the Colombian nominal GDP, i.e. the NFP/GDP ratio is constant (dotted line).  
Finally, we project possible increases in NFP Colombian outflows using an HP-filter trend 
(dashed-dotted line). On the right-hand side of figure 8, we plot the required increase in Colombian 
non-oil export in order to meet government’s current account expectations, following equation (1), 
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where CA is the current account, XOil and XNonOil are exports of Oil and Non-Oil respectively, M is 
imports and NFP is net factor payments. 
 
𝐶𝐴 = 𝑋𝑂𝑖𝑙 + 𝑋𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑂𝑖𝑙 −𝑀 +𝑁𝐹𝑃 (1) 
 
As shown by equation (1), once CA, XOil and M are known, either XNonOil or NFP still need to be 
fixed in order to determine all variables. In this first exercise, we define three different dynamics 
for NFP and determine the consistent dynamics for the non-oil exports required, such as those 
shown in equation (1). What emerges clearly is the enormous increase of non-oil export (as a 
percentage of GDP) that should take place since 2020 on in order to bring the trade balance under 
control and maintain the overall current account deficit around 3% of GDP by the end of 2024. 
[Figure 8] 
 
Figure 9 presents the results of the contrasting exercise. Here we make two different hypotheses 
on possible future evolution of Colombian non-oil exports and determine the value for Net Factor 
Payments. First, we assume them to grow on a par with GDP (dashed line in figure 9, left-hand 
side). Alternatively, we assume non-oil exports to grow according to its trend, as calculated 
through the HP filter applied to annual data from 1995 to 2013 (dotted line). On the right-hand 
side of figure 9, we show the implications of the aforementioned scenarios on NFP dynamics in 
order to meet the government current account target. What emerges is that NFP will remain 
reasonably negative for some years ahead. Nonetheless from 2020 onwards, the increasing gap 
between total imports and oil exports, and the ensuing widening overall trade deficit (in goods and 
services), together with an expected reduction in the current account deficit, implies that NFP will 
switch from negative to positive values. Needless to say, such a scenario appears at the very least 
unrealistic. This is even more so if it is linked to the government’s expectations regarding 
persistently positive net FDI over the next ten years. 
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[Figure 9] 
 
Figures 8 and 9 describe ‘implicit’ dynamics in non-oil Colombian exports or, alternatively, in 
NFP consistent with governmental targets on the overall current account balance. Let us now 
modify our perspective and assume that the Colombian current account is endogenous and 
determined by the prevailing trends in their several components. According to the different 
scenarios we assume, the Colombian current account may actually assume values quite separate 
from government expectations. 
  
5.3  Capital Account and Current account reconciliation 
 
Given the doubts shed on the government-forecasted value of the current account, we pursue our 
analysis by computing our own forecasts for the current account. We follow equation (1) and keep 
the government-forecasted values for oil exports and imports but use two different hypothesis for 
the value of non-oil exports and net factor payments. The left-hand side of figure 10 below portrays 
the dynamics of the current account for these three scenarios. Government expected current 
account dynamics (dashed line) remains in stark contrast to alternative records that would emerge 
in the case where non-oil exports and NFP grow at the same pace as Colombian GDP (dotted line) 
or, even worse, if they grew according to past trends (dash-dotted line). In these two cases, it 
emerges strikingly clearly that effective Colombian current account deficit may eventually turn 
out to be much deeper than expected. The right-hand side of figure 10 determines the needed 
dynamics of the capital account in order to maintain the Colombian foreign reserve as constant 
(keeping the current exchange rate constant), according to the various scenarios for the current 
account dynamics. Should the government’s expectation be confirmed, decreasing net positive 
capital inflows (as a ratio of GDP) would be more than enough to match the current account deficit 
and ensure stable Colombian foreign reserves (small dashed line). In the last decade, Colombia 
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has experienced a remarkable surge in net capital inflows. Things change radically if we assume 
that the Colombian current account will be the result of non-oil exports and net factor payments 
moving on a par with GDP (dash-dotted line) or, even worse, following past HP trends (long dash 
line). In both scenarios, Colombia would need constantly growing and indeed mounting capital 
account surpluses in order to cover the huge current account imbalances. 
[Figure 10] 
 
5.4 Foreign reserves dynamics 
 
The last exercise we ran is to determine the impact of the various scenarios at hand on the 
accumulation of foreign reserves, assuming a constant exchange rate. We assume two trends for 
each account of the balance of payment accounts, thus implying four different scenarios, on top of 
the governmental forecasts. Table 5 summarizes the various hypothesis made for each scenario.  
[Table 5] 
 
The possible increase, or stabilization, of Colombian foreign reserves basically requires foreign 
net capital inflows to move accordingly to observed dynamics in the current account. If the 
Colombian current account deficit effectively follows the expected trajectory, decreasing net 
capital inflows (as a percentage of GDP), in line with government expectations (3,4% of GDP 
yearly from 2014 to 2015), will ensure a slight increase in foreign reserves (small dashed line). 
Things improve when foreign capital inflows follow their HP-filter trend (scenario 3 and 4). In 
such a case, a large capital account surplus will materialize and allow Colombian foreign reserves 
to increase at the outset, even in the event that non-oil exports and, above all, NFP move at par 
with GDP (scenario 3). However, in this scenario, the Balance of payment surplus turns negative 
from 2018 onwards and the reserve stock starts decreasing and reaches 0 in 2023. In the case of 
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the HP-filter trend of the current account (scenario 4) foreign reserves will actually increase until 
2020, where they reach almost $ 83 billion. 
However, things may change dramatically in the case of the capital account meeting 
government forecasts (scenario 1 and 2). If non-oil exports and NFP grow according to GDP 
growth trends (scenario 1), foreign reserves start decreasing immediately and would turn negative 
by 2022 (dash-dotted line). Clearly, such a reduction will be even faster should NFP and non-oil 
exports follow their HP-filter trends (scenario 2).21 In such a scenario, Colombian foreign reserves 
will be driven close to zero by the end of 2019.  
[Figure 11] 
 
6. Policy Options 
 
What are the policy implications of these scenarios and expected dynamics in Colombian foreign 
reserves? In the last decade, the Colombian economy has become far more dependent on the 
exploitation and exports of its own natural resources in order to pay for increasing imports of 
capital goods. The exports of oil and related products represent (in 2012) much more than 50% of 
Colombian exports. According to data provided by DANE (2014), by the end of 2012, foreign 
imports represent more than 60% of the total supply (domestic production plus imports) of capital 
goods. This ratio was less than 47% in 2000. Such a deep structural change in the Colombian 
economy implies that the nominal exchange rate appreciation is a fundamental macroeconomic 
variable affecting Colombian capability to invest, accumulate capital stock and support economic 
growth. A depreciation of the exchange rate, by making imported capital goods more expensive, 
could easily curtail investments and growth. In order to avoid such an event taking place, available 
                                                          
21 It must be emphasized that, due to the mining-sector boom, the evolution of non-primary exports over the last decade has been 
particularly disappointing. The share of primary export (oil, coffee, flowers, bananas, etc.) in total exports rose from 74% in 2001 
to 81% in 2012 (Consejo Privado de Competitividad, 2013). 
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foreign reserves play a fundamental role – they are the weapon in the hands of the Central Bank 
to defend the domestic currency. A shortage of foreign reserves might start a financial crisis.  
Our analysis shows that there is no risk of such events taking place in the near future in 
Colombia. The right-hand side of figure 8, for instance, reveals that slightly increasing non-oil 
exports, as a share of GDP, will be enough to compensate for negative NFP and guarantee the 
Colombian current account to reach the government’s target in the next 2-3 years. Similarly, 
negative NFP do not need to be immediately reduced in order to ensure an easy management of 
the Colombian external account and the Colombian peso. Yet, our analysis also shows that some 
trends characterizing Colombia since the mid 2000s are unsustainable in the medium to long run. 
Should huge profit repatriation continue in the upcoming years according to the astonishing 
dynamics registered so far, net positive capital inflows will not suffice, even in the best possible 
scenario, to preserve Colombian foreign reserves or to avoid a possible exchange rate crisis.22  
Furthermore, government optimistic forecasts rely upon a type of ‘capital account-current 
account counter-balancing’ mechanism that might be suitable in terms of addressing short-term 
problems, but is likely to give rise to viciously unstable dynamics in the long run. In the end, this 
may turn out to be the main source of Colombia possible financial instability. According to Singh, 
 
“FDI investment creates foreign exchange liabilities not only now but also into the 
future. This characteristic leads to the danger that unfettered FDI may create a time 
profile of foreign exchange outflows (in the form of dividends payments or profit 
repatriation) and inflows (i.e. fresh FDI), which may be time inconsistent” (Singh, 2003, 
p. 209). 
  
Thus, important current foreign capital inflows, FDI in particular, provide the country with foreign 
currency flows covering current account deficits and, possibly, stabilizing the exchange rate (or 
                                                          
22 See Ocampo (2009) on the disruptive effects on the Colombian external account of a possible reduction in the price of primary 
commodities.   
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creating room for an exchange rate stabilization). However, they also create the basis for even 
higher foreign currency outlays in the upcoming years, hence the need for even stronger capital 
account inflow. The beneficial impact of FDI has a weak basis and may easily break down. Should 
capital inflow decrease due to a reduction in natural resource sector’s profitability, for example, 
the fundamental source of foreign currency inflow will dry up while the foreign currency outflow 
still exists. This is the kind of risk Singh puts forward and which Colombia may face in the 
medium/long-run. 
In order to be able to tackle such possible undesirable outcomes in advance, two policy 
measures come to mind. They are strictly linked each other. First, Colombia should reduce its 
dependence on foreign direct investment as both a source of foreign currency inflow and 
productive investment.  To clarify this point, this does not imply that Colombia should discourage 
FDI from taking place, in particular that which may lead to a diversification of its productive and 
export pattern. We are simply suggesting that FDI should represent only part, and perhaps not the 
most relevant part, of Colombian capital accumulation and development processes, together with 
productive initiatives undertaken by domestic participants. Second, and in accordance with the 
previous point, the Colombian government should implement policies that significantly diversify 
the export base. The Colombian government foresees a reduction in the production of oil since 
2017 onwards. There is no guarantee that the dynamics of non-oil exports (including other primary 
commodities) will be sustainable enough to avoid a widening current account deficit from taking 
place, nor to pay for increased repatriation of foreign companies’ profits. The expansion of 
Colombian product and export space may provide the required dynamics. In the end, such a 
strategy would be absolutely in line with the most recent evidence on successful episodes of long-
run economic development. It is the kind of goods exported that matters for growth (Haussmann 
et al. 2007), and product diversification characterizes a relevant part of the development process 
(Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003; Rodrik, 2007). This is even more relevant to the present case since, 
according to Hernandez Jimenez and Razmi (2014), Colombia is among those Latin American 
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economies in which an improvement in the trade account, perhaps via export diversification, 
provides a fundamental spur to economic growth. Apparently Colombia has followed a radically 
different development pattern from that outlined above, which has put too much emphasis on the 
exploitation of domestic natural resources as its main source of economic growth (the so called 
‘locomotora minera-energetica’).   
It might be wise for Columbia to use natural resource revenues to support a clear 
diversification strategy that might, at least partially, rebalance the development strategy it has 
followed so far. 
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Tables 
Table 1 – Estimation of Mining sector to GDP growth rate differential. Source Central Bank of 
Colombia and Authors’ computation. 
Variable Full sample 2001Q1-2007Q3 2007Q4-2012Q4 
Constant 0.02 (0.45) −1.07(0.75) 1.15**(0.37) 
Chow Test (2007Q3) 6.79 (0.01)   
 
 
Table 2 – Estimation of Manufacture sector to GDP growth rate differential. Source Central Bank 
of Colombia and Authors’ computation. 
Variable Full sample 2001Q1-2007Q3 2007Q4-2012Q4 
Constant -0.42 (0.22) 0.13(0.29) −0.99**(0.28) 
Chow Test (2007Q3) 7.23* (0.01)   
 
 
Table 3 – Decomposition of the manufacturing employment share’s variation, 2007-2013. Source 
Central Bank of Colombia, ILO (Labor Force Survey) and Authors’ computation. 
Labor share 
variation 
Labor-intensity 
variation 
Sector share 
variation 
Overall labor productivity 
variation 
-1,8 0,8 -3,0 0,4 
 
 
Table 4 – Estimation of FDI share accruing to Oil and Other sectors. Source Central Bank of 
Colombia and Authors’ computation. 
Variable Full sample 1996Q1-2001Q2 2001Q3-2012Q4 
Petrol and Mining share 0.42***(0.04) 0.12 (0.06) 0.56***(0.03) 
Chow Test (2007Q3) 52.08*** (0)   
 
 
Table 5 – Scenario description 
Scenario Current Account Hypothesis Capital Account Hypothesis 
1 NFP and XNonOil GDP-based. Government forecasts. 
2 
NFP and XNonOil HP-filter trend. 
Government forecasts. 
3 NFP and XNonOil GDP-based. HP-filter trend. 
4 
NFP and XNonOil HP-filter trend. 
HP-filter trend. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Annual real GDP growth (left), Balance of Payments surplus (right). Source: DANE. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Sectorial quarterly growth rates differential. Source: Central Bank of Colombia. 
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Figure 3 – Colombian effective real and nominal exchange rate (index number). Source: UNCTAD 
Datastat. 
 
Figure 4 – Colombian trade and current account balances. Source: Central Bank of Colombia and 
Authors’ computations. 
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Figure 5 – Overall current account and selected components’ dynamics. Source: from Central Bank 
of Colombia and Author’s computation. 
 
Figure 6 – FDI in Mining and Petrol, Others, and Total. Source: DANE. 
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Figure 7 – Government trade flow forecasts and expectations on current and capital account, and 
net FDI. Source: Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (2014b), Central Bank of Colombia and 
Authors’ computation. 
 
Figure 8 – NFP (different scenarios) and required non-oil exports to meet government’s CA target. 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (2014b), Central Bank of Colombia and Authors’ 
computation. 
 
Figure 9 – Non-oil exports (different scenarios) and required NFP to meet government’s CA target, 
Source: from Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (2014b), Central Bank of Colombia and 
Authors’ computation. 
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Figure 10 – Current account and capital account under different scenarios. Source: from Ministry 
of Finance and Public Credit (2014b), Central Bank of Colombia and Authors’ computation. 
 
Figure 11 – Expected dynamics in Colombian foreign reserves stock (different scenarios). Source: 
from Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (2014b), Central Bank of Colombia and Authors’ 
computation. 
 
 
